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ABSTRACT 
According to Piaget, children in the "preoperational 
stage" of development have difficulty separating fantasy 
from reality, the mental realm from the physical realm. 
This stage theory of cognitive development is called into 
question by the current study. In this study, 48 four-year 
olds performed a judgment task consisting of causality 
questions after having listened to either a fantasy or a 
reality based story. Results from the Tukey test across 
story types and the control group (no story) support the 
hypothesis that children can differentiate physical entities 
from thoughts about physical entities, (i .e ., Tukey summary 
statistic, dT=58. 07, p<. 05) and physical entities from 
thoughts about fantastical entities, (i.e. , Tukey summary 
statistic, dT=63.80, p<.05). It was also found that 
children can differentiate fantasy from reality. Findings 
show that the environmental influence ( fantasy or reality 
story) had no influence on the nature of the children's 
responses in the subsequent judgment task. Results from two 
e x perimenters concurred with the above findings, however 
their results differed significantly from each other. Verbal 
responses given by the children further support the data 
that children can differentiate the mental realm from the 
physical realm. 
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PREFACE 
This thesis investigates the effect of the environment 
(naturalistic or non-naturalistic influences ) on a young 
child's ability to distinguish between real physical 
phenomena and mental phenomena (e.g., an actual tangible 
kitty versu s a thought about a kitty or a thought about a 
fantastical impossible kitty, such as one which can fly). 
It is based on some research done by Wellman and Estes 
(1986) and Koutsourais (1984). 
Piaget (1952, 1962, 1969, 1971, 1972; in Bringuier, 
1980) has hypothesized that children between the ages of two 
to seven are in a "preoperational" developmental stage. 
Briefly, Piaget saw this stage as one in which the child's 
mental capabilities are not well enough developed to allow 
them to distinguish real physical events from mental events 
(See Appendix A for an outline of the Preoperational Stage). 
Piaget states the following: 
During the early stages the wor ld and the self are one; 
neither term is distinguished from the other. But when 
they become distinct, these two terms begin by 
remaining very close to each other: the world is still 
conscious and full of intentions, the self is still 
material ... only slightly interiorized (Piaget, 1951, 
244). 
Piaget theorizes that children's causal thinking is 
qualitatively, not just quantatively different from adult 
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thinking. Many investigators agree with Piaget. Most 
prominently, Sohan and Celia Modgil (1974; vols 1-8, 1976; 
1982) have extended and extensively analyzed and reviewed 
much of the literature and studies concerning Piaget's work. 
Among their accomplishments, they have published nine 
volumes on Piagetian Research. Barbel Inhelder worked with 
Piaget on the book, The Growth of Logical Thinking ( 1958) 
and also published a book with Hermaine Sinclair and Magali 
Bovet ( 1974). 
However, recent investigators, e.g., Wellman and Estes 
(1986), Berzonsky (1971), Prentice, Manosevitz and Hubbs 
(1978), have found that by using different methods, they 
were able to demonstrate that children have the ability to 
distinguish between mental and real physical events during 
this Piagetian "preoperational" period. If children in this 
preoperational stage are indeed capable of distinguishing 
the mental from the physical realm, what other factors might 
account for the fact that some 
demonstrate this ability? The 
environmental influences that 
children do not readily 
current study looked at 
were thought to strongly 
contribute to a child's ability in this area, namely 
non-naturalistic stories. The results did not confirm this 
thesis; children performing a judgment task after hearing a 
non-naturalistic story did not get results that differed 
from children hearing a naturalistic story. 
However, this study did confirm Wellman and Estes 
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(1986) e v idence that four y ear olds can distinguish between 
the physical and mental realms and between the mental 
possible realm (e.g., a thought about a kitty) and the 
mental impossible realm (e.g., a thought about a kitty that 
flies). 
Two points of clarification need to be stressed at the 
outset. One concerns the term "realism". As used b y 
Piaget, it refers to the attribution of physical status 
( e.g. , one can touch with one' hands, or see with one ' s 
eyes) to mental contents such as the content of a thought or 
dream. Hence, a child might honestly believe that a dreamed 
cat exists and can be physically interacted with, i.e., the 
dreamed cat is ph y sical, or "real" hence the term 
"realism". This definition runs counter to a common sense 
understanding of the term realism, i.e., something natural, 
real and physical, which is NOT Piaget's meaning. 
The second clarification involves the classification of 
the mental and physical realm. This distinction has been 
referred to by numerous terms which the following chart 
indicates: 
PHYSICAL MENTAL 
objective ............. . ... subjective 
reality ................... fantasy 
external .................. internal 
the thing ................. the idea 
the referent .............. the name 
the thing signified ....... the sign 
concrete .................. abstract 
tangible .... .. ............ intangible 
material .................. immaterial 
real . ..................... pretend 
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For the sake of clarity, I will emphasize the term 
"physical" rather than " real " when referring to the ph y sical 
realm in distinction to the mental realm because the mental 
realm can also be considered real, i.e., thoughts ARE real 
in a certain sense. However, in referring to one aspect of 
the mental realm, I wi 11 interchangeably use the terms 
"mental-impossible" and "fantasy" to designate thoughts 
about things that are possible to think of 
( epistemologically possible) yet impossible in a physical 
sense ( metaphysically impossible), such as a flying kitty. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Various methods have been used to determine how and 
when a child learns to distinguish mental phenomena from 
physical phenomena. Most notably, the prodigious studies by 
Jean Piaget have sought to answer these questions. In 
studying and categorizing children's causal explanations, 
Piaget developed a stage theory of cognitive development. 
Piaget's Clinical Approach 
Piaget theorized that children roughly between the ages 
of two to seven years pass through a stage of causal 
reasoning dominated by the following types of thinking 
( Piaget , 1 9 5 2 , 19 6 2 , 196 9 ) : 
1. Motivational causality 
2. Phenomenistic causality 
3. Finalistic causality 
4. Moralistic causality 
5. Magical causality 
6. Animistic causality 
7. Artificialistic causality 
(see Appendix B for definitions) 
In trying to grasp how children distinguish mental from 
physical activities, Piaget's questions were on the order of 
"What is thinking?" "What do you think with?" "What is 
thought?" "Where is the dream made?" "Where do dreams take 
place?" "Can dreams be red or heavy?" Wellman and Estes 
(1986) criticize such questions as being misleading. It is 
misleading to ask what dreams are made of for it implies 
that dreams are material in nature, and the child may not 
yet have the abstract concepts to describe the mental nature 
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of dreams, al though they ostensibly can note similarities 
and differences between dreams and tangible existents. 
Also, the CONTENT of a dream can be heavy or red and the 
child might think the questioner is commenting on the 
content of the dream and not the abstraction "dream" itself. 
Wellman and Estes comment that children often speak in a 
non-literal manner, using metaphors or analogies. In this 
way, children might be answering the questions about mental 
phenomena "as if" they were real physical phenomena. The 
following is an example of Piaget's questioning from his 
book The Child's Conception of the World (1929): 
Kenn (7 1/2): What do you think with? - Inside my 
head. -Is the head empty or full? - Full. If someone 
opened your head, would they see when you were 
thinking? - No, because they couldn't see. - If they 
could look inside your head without your dying, would 
they see your thought? (Piaget, 1929, p.41) 
From this type of clinical methodology, Piaget draws 
the conclusion, "The child knows nothing of the nature of 
thought, even at the stage when he is being influenced by 
adult talk concerning 'mind, ' 'brain, ' 'intelligence. '" 
(Piaget, 1929, p. 37). 
In contrast to Piaget's ideas on the young child's 
ability to distinguish between fantasy and reality, an 
alternative interpretation is offered in the general 
discussion at the end of this thesis. 
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Methodology used by other researchers 
Although Piaget's Stage Theory of intellectual 
development has had much support, it has also received much 
criticism. Looking at the empirical literature, Wellman and 
Estes ( 1986), as mentioned, criticized Piaget's studies on 
the grounds of asking misleading and open-ended questions in 
his experiments on causality. Using real/not-real sorting 
tasks and judgment tasks with children ages 3-5, Wellman and 
Estes found that, in contrast to Piaget's conclusions, 
children as young as 3 1/2 were almost consistently able to 
explicitly distinguish realit y from fantasy. Not only that, 
these children were able to distinguish between mental 
entities that are possible (e.g., a thought about a kitty ) 
from mental entities that are impossible (e.g. , a thought 
about a kitty that flies}, a more abstract distinction. 
Results of the current study support this early ability of 
children to make physical/ mental possible/ metal impossible 
dist i nctions. 
Berzonsky (1971} also questioned Piaget's Stage Theor y . 
He looked at how children "phenomenistically" explain cause 
and effect. Using a 22 question interview, a teeter-totter 
task and a water level apparatus with six and seven year 
olds , Berzonsky found that a decisive factor in children ' s 
causal thinking is their FAMILIARITY with the objects or 
events in question. Again, Piaget ' s emphasis on maturing 
intellectual structures and his de-emphasis on the role of 
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experience in children's causal reasoning is unsupported by 
the results of this study. 
Morrison and Gardner (1978) used card sorting tasks and 
verbatim protocols to specify the characteristics children 
use to distinguish fantasy from reality, Their results 
raise questions about the appropriateness of Piaget's 
methodology. Their subjects were kindergarten, second, 
fourth and sixth graders. Their results indicate that 
fantasy characters were distinguished from real characters 
in terms of their POWER and MAGIC, They noted that although 
younger children have some difficulty expressing their 
knowledge VERBALLY, they do demonstrate their understanding 
of real versus pretend in card sorting tasks. This brings 
into question Piaget's methodology: did his methods 
accurately tap children's abilities? 
Prentice, Manosevitz and Hubbs (1978) found a 
correlation between a child's belief or non-belief in 
mythical figures and parental encouragement or 
discouragement of such beliefs. They found that parents who 
encouraged children to believe had children who believed, 
whereas the six parents in their study who discouraged 
belief in Santa Claus had children who all disbelieved. 
This study lends support to the idea that parents play an 
important role in their children's ability to distinguish 
fantasy from reality. 
Lesser and Paisner (1985) take an entirely different 
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angle on investigating Piaget's Stage Theory of causal 
reasoning. Using a causality interview and Randall and 
DesRosier's (1980) Measurement of Supernatural Belief scale, 
they found that adults in a New Age ( religious sect) 
community showed thinking characteristic of Piaget's 
preoperational stage of mental development ( ages 2-7). For 
example, Lesser and Paisner quote a woman as stating the 
following: 
This is very subtle, and sounds kind of weird, 
probably, but I feel like what happens collectively 
among people affects weather. I mean I believe that 
Indians doing dances, rain dances, can create rain. (p. 
69) 
The fact that many adults in this study demonstrate 
"preoperational" causal thinking, seriously draws into 
question Piaget's notion that concepts 0£ causality develop 
in tandem with developing mental logical structures. 
Dworetzsky ( 1984), in a chapter on Piaget, comments that 
"The fact that we develop cognitively doesn't necessarily 
mean that we develop the ability to distinguish truth from 
fiction." What could account for this seeming contradiction-
that many adults could be in the preoperational stage? 
Koutsourais ( 1984) looked at environmental influences 
on children's causal thinking. Specifically, she looked at 
the influence of story telling on children's causal 
explanations. Using a story about evaporation told to 4 and 
5 year olds, she found that magical thinking still occurred 
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after the children had been given a more naturalistic 
explanation for the event (evaporation) in the stor y . Also, 
the naturalistic explanation offered by the experimenter did 
not generalize to another story for which the children gave 
explanations. Koutsourais feels that the choice of 
something as abstract as evaporation, which is not part of a 
child's daily experience, could have masked their actual 
abilities. She also comments that her study did not 
adequately tap whether the children actually believed their 
non-naturalistic responses or whether they were engaging in 
make believe. She emphasizes the importance of asking the 
children whether they believe their own responses or are 
just pretending. 
Piaget's Stage Theory of causal thinking minimizes but 
does not exclude the role of the environment in effecting 
children's causal thinking. It emphasizes that younger 
children don't simply know less than older children, they 
actually think differently due to the QUALITATIVELY 
differing underlying cognitive brain structures. Older 
children have more advanced underlying biological cognitive 
structures which have also had more time to flexibly adapt 
to their environment. 
This notion of developing age specific yet flexible 
"logical 
reasoning 
empirical 
structures" which account for the type of 
a child engages 
studies using 
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in is untenable given recent 
more concrete measures. An 
alternative theory on the development of causal thinking 
is thought to better account for Piaget's results plus the 
observations in the above studies. In brief, the main 
discrepancies between Piaget's studies and 
studies are: 
the above 
1. That young children whom Piaget would categorize 
as unable to explicitly differentiate mental from physical 
DO demonstrate their ability to do so when given less 
abstract tasks. 
2. Adults, who should have passed through the 
"preoperational stage" of causal thinking onto the formal 
operational stage have been shown to routinely and 
characteristically exhibit all sorts of non-naturalistic, 
non-causal thinking, e.g., astrologers, palm readers, and 
members of the above mentioned New Age community. 
Piaget's observations and descriptions about children's 
abilities are not in question in this study. His 50 years 
of studying children has stimulated much interest in the 
field of cognitive development. What is of concern regarding 
Piaget is: 
a) Did his METHODS accurately tap children's abilities? 
- with a focus specifically on age 4 (preoperational stage) 
b) Does his stage THEORY adequately account for our 
current empirical data, specifically data indicating that 
children as young perhaps as 3 1/2 can accurately 
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differentiate between the mental and physical realm? (What 
about parental and other environmental encouragement of 
fantasy?) 
c) What role does environmental encouragement of 
non-naturalistic thinking play in the cognitive development 
of young children? 
This area of research has widespread implications. 
The ideas we have about the developing child's mind 
influence our childrearing practices, our educational 
perspectives and ultimately the type of culture, 
and aesthetics that predominate. For example, 
politics 
different 
schools emphasize encouragement of naturalistic thinking 
(e.g., Montessori schools) wher eas other schools 
explicitly denounce such an approach and actively encourage 
non-naturalistic thinking (e .g., Waldorf method). 
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Statement of Purpose of the Current Study 
The purpose of the current study is to examine the 
effect of the environment on children's causal thinking and 
to validate that "preoperational" children can differentiate 
mental phenomena from physical phenomena and that they can 
distinguish fantasy from reality when these distinctions are 
assessed very concretely. 
The main hypotheses are the following: 
1 ) That the environment can influence causal thinking in 
young children. Specifically, environmental encouragement 
of non-causal, non-naturalistic thinking will hamper a 
4 year old child's ability to distinguish fantasy from 
reality. 
2) That young children are capable of differentiating 
fantasy from reality; the physical from the mental possible 
the latter from the mental impossible. 
METHODS 
Subjects 
Fourty-eight four year old children were selected from 
five nursery schools (Frenchtown Learning Center, Y's Owl, 
Doric Day, Johnston Childcare Center and Kindercare) and one 
YMCA day camp, Camp Tenderfoot in Rhode Island. Selection 
was dependent on parental approval and child assent (see 
Appendix C for Parental Letter and Informed Consent). The 
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24 bo y s and 24 girls all came from a predominatel y 
middle --class town population. Demographic questionnaires 
were sent home for the parents to fill out and return and 41 
of the 48 questionnaires were returned. However, complete 
data on measures pertinent to the analyses was available on 
all 48 subjects. Demographic questionnaires are in Appendix 
D and demographic information is in Appendix E. 
Procedure 
After receiving permission from the camp, school or 
day - care, parental permission slips were sent home. 
Following parental consent, the experimenter invited the 
child to be in the study. This study was limited to those 
children who voluntarily verbalized and nonverbally 
indicated interest in the tasks. 
Children were randomly assigned to one of three 
groups (control, reality-based story and fantasy-based 
story) in a rotating fashion. In addition each child 
received the six stimuli (cards: two physical, two mental 
possible, two mental impossible) in a randomly 
counterbalanced manner (using a Latin Square arrangement). 
Each child was individually tested in the least 
distractable place available. For the two treatment 
conditions, the children listened to a short story 
(approximately two minutes in length). For the control 
condition, no story was told. The experimenter sat facing 
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the child but avoiding eye contact while the child listened 
to the taped story to avoid inadvertently influencing the 
child. All three groups were then shown colorful cards 
with a child on each card. 
The experimenter introduced the card with a comment 
that the child is either THINKING ABOUT or HAS an object. 
The comments fall 
below. 
into one of three categories as listed 
PHYSICAL 
1, Susi e likes cookies . Right now she HAS a cookie. 
2. Joe likes puppies. Right now he HAS a puppy with him. 
MENTAL - metaphysically POSSIBLE 
3. Jeff is THINKING of a brownie. 
4, Sara is THINKING of a bird. 
MENTAL - metaphysically IMPOSSIBLE 
5, Darlene is THINKING of an APPLE THAT DANCES. 
6, Alex is THINKING of an ANT RIDING A BICYCLE . 
After presenting each card, the children were 
asked six questions; the first four questions were analyzed 
for Experiment 1 and the last two questions were analyzed 
for Experiment 2. The questions are based on the three 
criteria differentiating the physical and mental realm as 
defined by Wellman and Estes (1986). 
are as follows: 
The criteria 
l)BEHAVIORAL-SENSORY CONTACT: Real entities can be 
touched and they occupy an exact space. They cannot be 
wished away. Mental entities cannot be physically touched; 
they can be wished away, 
2) PUBLIC 
real entities. 
entity. 
EXISTENCE: Other people can also touch 
They cannot touch a dreamed or imagined 
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3) CONSISTENT EXISTEN CE: Dreamed or imagined entit ies 
can disappear over time; real entities will consistentl y 
endure over t ime. ( My real table will l ook the same 
tomorrow, a dreamed t able is mentall y malleable and can 
poof(!) out of existence . ) 
The actual judgme n t task ques tio ns the children a re asked 
(i.e ., the dependent v ariable) are the following: 
Behavioral-sensory contact: 
1. Ca n ______ SEE t he 
2 . Ca n ___ ___ TOUCH the 
Public Existence : 
with her e y es ? 
with her hands ? 
3. Can _______ 's friend SEE the ______ with his e yes? 
Cons istent Existence: 
4 . Can __ ___ (act on, e.g . , "pet") her TOMORROW? 
Chi ldren responded YES/NO/I DON'T KNOW, and pr esentat ion 
or der of the stimul u s cards was cou nterbalanced across 
subjects. 
A further way that the mental and real differ is t ha t 
mental entities ca n be about things that co uld possibl y 
happen in realit y (e . g . ' a flower that is red) or menta l 
entities c an be abo u t things that are totall y fantastical, 
i magi nar y and could never e x ist in re ali t y (e . g ., a flower 
that talks ) . The last tw o questions on each card 
investigate d this ability. 
5) Ha v e you ever reall y seen ______ ? 
6) Can y ou close you r eyes and think about ? 
-----
The chi ldren were a sked to e x plain random answers . 
This qualitative data was anal yz ed separately according to 
t h e c riteria used b y Wellman and Estes (1986, Appendix G). 
This information was used to clarif y the findings (actua l 
resp onses are in Appendix H ) . 
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E ch child was asked a total of 36 questions, (6 cards 
with 6 questions on each), where they gave y es/no/I don't 
know responses ( idk) . The actual dependent ariable was 
the number of yes responses over 
pos sible responses in each category . 
the total numb er of 
[Dependent variable= es/ (yes +no+ idk) = percent yes) 
Des ign 
A post-test o nl y , control and c ontras t group, mi x ed 
factorial design was used. There were three factors 
in vo l v ed; two between groups factors ( 1} the type of 
pretest 
story, 
en i ronme n tal infl u ence (no story, r eality-based 
fantasy-based story) and (2) the experimenter ( the 
author and an assistant) and one wit hin subjects factor (the 
i te rn t ype: physical, mental possible, mental impossible). 
The design is outlined below in Table 1. 
Table 1 
Post-test only Control and Contrast Grou p Design 
Group 
Realit y -based story 
Fantas y- based stor y 
Contro l (no story) 
Judgmen t Task 
R 
R 
R 
Xl 01 
X2 02 
R d esignates random assignment as equation 
X designates treatment co n ditions 
03 
0 designa tes the dependent va riable (j ud gment tas k ) 
The design (3 x 2 x 3) is considered a mixed factorial 
design, noted b y Keppel ( 1982 ) as an Ax B x (C x S) 
design where A and B rep resent the independen t between 
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<1roups factors 
the repeated 
(story type and experimenter), C represents 
measure factor (the judgment task) and S 
represents the subject factor. ANOVA analysis using BMDP 
following suggestions by Co ll yer and Enns ( 1987) was 
conducted as the main focus of the study. Additional 
analyses were done on questions 5 and 6 of the judgment 
ta sk as an extra validation that 4 y ear olds can 
distinguish the mental possible from the mental impossible 
categories. 
Va lidit y 
Random assignment and ensurin g an adequate and 
equal number of subjects per cell (6 per cell,48 total) 
helps to increase the probability that groups were 
equivale nt at the outset. A pretest was not feasible 
since it would be highl y reactive with the posttest. 
Stimulus cards (physical, mental possible, mental 
impossible) were counterbalanced to avoid a SERIAL-ORDER 
BIAS. Audiotap ed stories were used and standardized 
procedures for administering the judgment task were 
followed. 
Differences 
partially reduced 
in 
by 
performances among subjects is 
using a within factor; and subject 
differences are generally controlled by random assignment. 
To reduce the te ndenc y of children to communicate the 
content of the task to other children ( hence influencing 
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internal v alidit y) of a more salient, playful task was 
c ond uc ted at the END ea ch session . This task was not part 
of t h e experiment . The task was tossing a bea n ba g 
into a wooden frame or a similar activit y . This physical 
activity is meant solel y to pro vide a more e x citing and 
salien t activity that will ha v e a greater pro ba bilit y of 
being c hatted about as opposed to the more sedate stories 
and quest i ons. 
Since the researcher was assuming a short range 
environmental effect wou ld be effective abo v e the child's 
natural environmental i nfluences, she made the fantasy 
story more explicit to be a more powerful influen ce. 
The stori e s are equ iv alent in leng th and pa r allel in 
content . 
The current study was design ed to rule ou t 
cr iticism of Koutsourais' study ( 1984 ) . I t th u s d eals 
with conc re tes dail y encountered by children (e . g . , a 
soft kitty , a brownie ) , not higher level abs tract ions such 
as evaporation . 
Also, unlike Koutsourais' study, the res ear cher was 
not l ooking f or short range generalizability of reality 
status within a child's responses, but gr oup diff er ences 
across children . Koutsourais approac hed the prob l e m 
hoping that children wou l d generalize their knowle d ge 
across s ituations. 
Wellman and Estes ( 198 6) looked at children's 
15 
abilit y 
mental 
to differentiate the ph y sical 
realm; the mental impossible 
realm from the 
from the mental 
possible. The current study used their empirical data as a 
base and focused o n whether the environment could 
differentially affect the abilities they found in y oun g 
children. The current control group is an adapted version 
of their study and the current stimulus and DV response 
questions are based on their format. 
Experiment 1: Story Type with Judgment Task 
Results 
A mixed factorial analysis of variance was conducted to 
test for the effects of an environmental influence ( story 
type : fantasy, reality, no story) on causal thinki ng (i.e . , 
a subsequent multile vel judgme n t task) . This addresses the 
first hypothesis. There were two between factors (story 
type and experimenter) and one within factor ( judgment 
task). The dependent variable was the percentage of 
quest i ons answered "yes" on the y es/no judgment task. 
Results of the mixed ANOVA did not show the expected 
interaction between story type and judgment task (see Table 
2) . The analysis revea led one significant interaction 
between judgment type (physical, mental possible, mental 
impossible) and the individual experimenters, F(2,84)=11 . 47, 
p < .05. The Tukey test showed significant differences on the 
children's responses between the physical and mental realm, 
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p< . 05. No si gni ficant differences were found between the 
mental poss ible realm and th e mental impossible rea l ms, nor 
were they e xpected . The significant Tukey results were t h e 
same for both experimenters. 
Table 2 
ANOVA Story x Experimenter 
Sour ce of vari ation df Sum of Squares 
Story 2 1566.2977 
Experi menter 1 11849 . 2 296 
Story x Ex perimtr 2 10280.4904 
S/ Story Experim tr 42 68758 . 1380 
Totals 47 92454 . 1557 
Judgment 2 
Judgment Story 4 
Judgment Experimtr 2 
Judgment Story Exptr 4 
Sx Judgmt(StoryxExpt) 84 
53550 . 3472 
3015.4080 
13283 . 4201 
3871 . 5278 
48 649.088 5 
Total 143 2 14823.94748 
(x Judgment) 
Means Squared E 
78 3 .1 4 8 8 
11849 . 2296 
5140.2452 
16 37 . 0985 
2 6775.1736 
753 . 8520 
6641 . 7101 
967 . 8819 
579 .1558 
. 48 
7 . 24* 
3 .1 4 
46 . 23** 
1. 30 
11.47** 
1. 67 
The main effects of both the judgment task and the 
e x perimenters were also significant . For the judgment task 
results were F(2 , 84)=42 . 26, p< . 05; for t he experim enters the 
results were F( l,42)=7.24, p< . 05. From the graphs below it 
can be seen that children could clearly distinguish ph y sical 
status from mental status. It can also be seen that the 
experimenters showed similar effects across the jud d ment 
tasks bu t there was also a significant diffe r ence between 
ex perimenters. 
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Figure 1 
Mean Proportion of "yes'' answers as functions of judgment 
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Mean Proportion of " If yes answers as functions of 
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The mean d ependent v ariable ( proportion "y es " ) for th i s 
tw o wa y int e raction ranged from 3 2. 5521 to 96.35 4 . The mean 
s cores a re lis t ed i n the means table ( Table 1) . 
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Table 3 
Mean Proportion "y es " in the Two-Way Interaction 
( Judgment x Experimenter ) 
Judgment 
Experimenter N Physical Mental Mental 
possible impossible 
1 24 96.35 32.55 38.28 
2 24 87.76 68.23 65.62 
Note: Higher means indicate children perceive the topic of 
the item as having a physical status. 
From the graphs it appears that significant differences 
might be found between the physical and the two mental 
judgment task conditions (Figure 1). Significant differences 
would also be anticipated between the two experimenters on 
the mental conditions (Figure 2). This was confirmed b y 
simple effect analysis and Tukey follow up tests. 
Simple effects analysis of the judgment task indicate 
significant results for judgment at experimenter 1, 
F( 2, 46) =43. 68, p<. 001 and for judgment at experimenter 2, 
F(2,46)=6.72, p<.01 (see Table 4 below). 
Table 4 
Analy sis of the Simple Effects involving Judgment 
factor} 
Source df Sum of Squares Mean Square 
J at el 2 59807.94 
J x S/El 46 31494.14 
J at e2 2 7025.82 
J x S/E2 46 24041.88 
*Fcritical value(2,46)=3.17,p<.05; 
**Fcv(2,46) =5 .13,p<.01; 
***Fcv(2,46 ) =8.13 ,p<.001 . 
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29903.97 
684.66 
3512.91 
522.65 
(Within 
F 
43.68*** 
6.72** 
The follow up Tukey tests (Table 5 ) further illuminate 
these differences, With both experimenters the children gave 
significantly more "yes" answers in the physical status than 
they did in either the mental possible or the mental 
impossible, showing that they were distinguishing the 
physical from the mental realm, Also, they showed no 
significant differences in the mental categories; the study 
was not designed to tease out such differences, so that 
these results also are consistent with the fact that 
overall, the children could distinguish the mental (both 
categories) from the physical realm, 
Table 5 
Tukey Test: Pairwise Comparisons of Means 
Tukey for J at el 
jl j2 
jl 
j2 58.07 -
* 
j3 63,80 5.73 -
...!_ * 
dT=18.32, p<,05 
jl=physical j2=mental possible 
Note: dT is the summary statistic 
Tukey for J at e2 
jl j2 j3 
jl 
j2 19.53 
* 
j3 22,14 2.61 
* 
dT=16.0l, p<,05 
j3=mental impossible 
of the Tukey test, 
Analysis of the simple effects of experimenter indicate 
that no significant differences were found on the physical 
judgment task (see Table 6), Significant differences were 
found for both mental tasks; for the mental possible 
condition, F(l,46)=10,22, p<,01 and for the mental 
impossible condition, F(l,46)=6,002, p<.05. 
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Table 6 
Analysis of Simple Effects involving Experimenter (between 
factor) 
Source 
Eat jl 
S/EJ 
Eat j2 
S/EJ 
Eat j3 
S/EJ 
df 
1 
46 
1 
46 
1 
46 
Sum of Squares 
886.2304 
68758.138 
15274.25 
68758.138 
8971.9 
68758.138 
Fcv(l,46)=4.06, p<.05 
Mean Square 
886.2304 
1494.7421 
15274.25 
1494.7421 
8971. 9 
1494.7421 
F 
.59 
10.22** 
6.002* 
Fcv(l,46}=7.25, p<.01 
The omega squared results ( treatment magnitude) 
indicate that 5.6% of the variability observed is explained 
by the judgment x e xperimenter interaction. This is a 
relatively small effect. Judgment alone accounts for 24.2% 
of the var iablilt y, a large effect, whereas the experimenter 
accou _nted for 10. 85% of the observed variability, a large 
effect. 
Experiment 2: Reality, Mental-Possib le, Mental-impossible 
Probe 
Results 
This experiment addresses the second hypothesis, that 
young children are capable of differentiating fantasy from 
reality; the physical from the mental possible and the 
latter from the mental impossible. For all judgment levels, 
children correctly answered questions 5 and 6 assessing 
reality status and the ability to think about the entities 
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discussed. Responses to both questions greatly exceeded a 
chance value of 50%. For question 5 (Have have you ever 
really SEEN a __ ?) children answered respectively for 
physical, mental and mental impossible responses, 98%, 96%, 
91% correctly. 
For question 6 (Could you close your e y es and THINK 
about ? ) children answered re spec ti vely, for physical, 
mental possible and mental impossible conditions, 89%, 82%, 
82% correctly. Four year olds on these questions 
demonstrate a clear abilit y to differentiate physical status 
from mental status. (See Figure 3 and Table 7) 
Table 7 
Physical Mental-possible Mental-impossible 
CARDS % CARDS % CARDS % 
A+B correct C+D correct E+F correct 
Question 0=94 98% 0=92 96% 0=9 91% 
5 E=48* E=47.5* E=48* 
Question 0=86 89% 0=79 82% 0=79 82% 
6 E=48* E=48* E=48* 
E*= the expected chance response frequency of sample (50%) 
0 = the observed frequency 
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Figure 3 
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Categories of Explanation 
Children's verbal responses showed a range of 
understanding on the differences between physical entities 
and mental entities, both possible and impossible (fanta s y). 
Responses were grouped into 6 broad categories according to 
Wellman and Estes groupings (1986, see Appendix G). 
Table 8 
Categories of Explanations Frequency 
1. Mental term-repetition ........... 31 
2. Mental term-substitution ........... 32 
3. Reality-a.meet criteria ............ 30 
b.fail criteria ............ 42 
4. Reality status - a.real ............ 12 
b.not real, fake ... 4 
5. Location - a. it is there .......... 25 
b.it's not there ........ 33 
6. Uninterpretable or I don't know .... 50+ 
The actual responses are in Appendix H. Some children gave 
many responses and others gave none so this chart is only 
giving a rough estimate of the types of responses found and 
their distribution. It was interesting that children used 
different mental verbs spontaneously (Mental term 
-substitution) such as dreaming, imagining, in my mind, in 
my head. It is also noteworthy that not many children 
actually said "It's real" or "It's fake" (reality status 
category). 
following: 
Some of the responses were striking such as the 
"Your mind can think about anything it wants to." 
"Because Darlene is thinking of it, not her friend" 
"Because no friends can see in other people's minds." 
"Because he's thinking of it and the other person can't see 
it. II 
"Cuz if it were in both minds they could see it." 
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"Not if it's dancing, that would be a cartoon." 
"Not if she's thinking of it cuz it's just her imagination." 
"That would be funny, a little bicycle - there's no such 
thing." 
These type of responses do reveal the four year old 
child's ability to use mental terms with good understanding. 
There ~ere also some responses, but not many, that showed a 
child's confusion, e.g. , "I know a man who can turn into a 
car." 
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Discussion 
Children performed at high levels on the physical 
condition of the judgment task meaning that when asked 
questions such as "Right now Susie has a cookie, can she 
touch it with her hands ... see it with her eyes ... can her 
friend see her cookie ... can she save her cookie and eat it 
tomorrow", the children gave correct affirmative answers. 
When asking the same type questions but using a mental 
verb, (e.g. , Susie is THINKING about a cookie ... ) the 
children's responses showed a significant drop from the 
physical condition reflecting that they were making 
distinctions between the physical and mental realms. 
Two experimenters independently ran children in the 
study and with both experimenters, the children showed the 
same ability to distinguish the physical from the mental 
realms. However, the experimenter blind to the study showed 
this ability to a significantly lesser degree. To examine 
why one experimenter, blind to the study, had subjects whose 
responses supported the hypothesis that children can 
distinguish the physical from mental realms but not as 
clearly so as the original researcher, the children's verbal 
responses were examined. Experimenter bias is one possible 
explanation. From examining notes on the verbal responses 
and elaborations of the children during the judgment task, 
it seems that the primary researcher was able to tap into 
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the children ' s abilit y better. For example, where the 
pattern of responses was found to consistentl y support the 
idea that children can very clearly tell the difference 
between thinking and having, different children of 
experimenter 1 gave the following elaborations: 
Cuz thinking is only in the imagination. 
Because it's inside of him, he's thinking. 
Because he doesn't have it. 
Not if she's thinking of one, cuz it's just in her 
imagination. 
Because she's just thinking about it. 
Only if that friend is thinking about the apple that 
dances too. 
Cuz she's thinking of it. 
Because he's thinking of it and the other person can't 
see it. 
Because it's not there. 
Because no friend can see in other people's minds. 
Because she's just thinking about it. 
These responses further strengthen the notion that the 
above children who answered in these accurate patterns did 
indeed demonstrate their ability to distinguish thinking 
from having. 
The researcher bl ind to the study did not tend to 
stress the words "thinking" and "has" and as consistently as 
e x perimenter 1, and this seemingly slight administrative 
change might partially contribute to significant differences 
across e x perimenters. Perhaps the children ' s FOCUS was thus 
not directed as clearl y to the thinking/having distinction 
and the children answered more randomly. When looking at 
the v erbal responses in experimenter 2' s subjects who did 
not have the accurate pattern, there is evidence for this 
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speculation. ( The list of verbal responses is in Appendix 
H.) 
In doing this type of a study, the issue of focusing 
the child's attention seems to be of fundamental importance 
in order to obtain responses from the children that most 
accurately reflect their abilities. There were several 
potential confounding factors that the researcher had to 
occasionally work to overcome. These included the child's 
competing activity in the classroom at the time that the 
experimenter approached the child (e.g. , snacks, recess); 
another factor was the manner in which the child's teacher 
introduced the experimenter; yet another was the fact that 
the experimenter was a new person introducing the child into 
a novel situation. Also, the "least distractable areas" 
varied across schools - some were noisier than others. 
Within the task, the use of the taperecorder seemed to 
work especially well and the length of the story for this 
task (about a minute and a half) was ideal for the child's 
attention span - there were no children who objected to this 
procedure. 
The ease in administrating the 36 questions varied; 
there were some children who were easy to engage and talked 
very freely and could have gone on with even more questions; 
other children seemed to find the questions more difficult 
to attend to for the duration, e.g., focusing a shy child's 
attention for this duration was straining. There was also 
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the occasional problem of wondering what aspect of the 
question the child was focused on; an occasional child would 
answer as if he or she was attending to a word, say cupcake 
or dog, and not the the physical mental distinctions. As a 
result the child would answer tangentially talking about 
cupcakes they had at home or talking about their dog, such 
that their answers were not necessarily tapping their 
ability to distinguish physical from mental. 
One last potential confound was that the probe "If she 
wanted to, could she SEE it with her eyes?" seemed to cause 
more confusion than other probes, and it was realized that 
even adults use the word "see" often to refer to mental 
ideation, e.g., "I SEE what you mean", "I can really SEE 
that." 
To deal with some of these critiques of the current 
study, especially regarding the experimenter differences, it 
is suggested that very clear standardized rules are put 
forth to guide the experimenters under what circumstances 
and how they are to deal with the different difficulties of 
FOCUSING the child's attention. Pre-test training is highly 
advised and perhaps the primary researcher should not be 
involved in order to rule out the possibility of 
experimenter bias. Focusing the child's attention to the 
appropriate aspects of the task are fundamental if this 
methodology is to have validity. 
The fact that story type had no effect was surprising. 
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-It seems that the children's reality testing in this sample 
was more resilient to short term fantasy influences than the 
researcher had considered. Indeed, many of the verbal 
responses reinforce the fact of the children's clarity and 
only a small number of responses indicated a confusion about 
reality status 
car."). Given 
( g II I e • • ' 
that the 
know a man who can turn into a 
overwhelming majority of books, 
movies and television shows noted ( in Appendix I) as 
favorites by the parents were fantasy based, it is 
impressive that four-year olds have been able to gain 
clarity between reality and fantasy. One suggestion for 
future research would be would be to employ stories that 
varied in content from simple fantasy-reality testing (e.g., 
about a cat) versus content that is more affect laden and 
encouraged by adults (e.g., about Santa Claus). This might 
help to further fine tune both the role of environmental 
influences and children's ability to distinguish fantasy 
from reality. 
Further dramatic evidence of the child's ability to 
gain clarity between reality and fantasy can be seen in the 
second experiment. When children were asked two questions 
at the end of each judgment, (six per child), their 
responses were illuminating. When asked "Can there really 
be an (entity discussed on card)?", they answered "yes" 
correctly across cards A & B ( physical status) 98% of the 
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time, "yes" correctl y across cards C & D (mental possible 
status) 96% and "no" correctly across cards E & F ( mental 
impossible) 91% of the time- indicating that indeed they 
knew that there could, for example, never be an apple that 
dances or an ant that rides a bike. However, when asked if 
they could close their eyes and think about each situation, 
the children that said "yes" they could think about things 
that existed ( physical condition, 89% answered correctly); 
that were in the mind but could exist (mental possible, 82%) 
and that were in the mind but could never exist (mental 
impossible, 82%). Thus, the vast majority of children knew 
that ants riding bikes and apples that dance can't really 
exist ( 91%) yet they realized they could close their eyes 
and think about such scenes, (82%). Their ability to make 
the distinction between the mental possible and the mental 
impossible is a finer distinction than the distinction 
between the physical and mental realms. 
Theoretical Implications 
Piaget's theory places child's ability to distinguish 
fantasy from reality at about the ages of 6 to 7 and thus 
the role of the environment has less impact. Rand ' s theory 
holds that the child notes similarities and differences 
among its experiences from its youngest years and that the 
child's ability to categorize and integrate its experience 
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depends on the amount of experience and the amount of mental 
integration done and the environmental encouragment or 
discouragment of his or her ability to differentiate and 
integrate its knowledge (1968/1975, 1979), 
Rand's ( 1979) and Kelly's views ( 1984, 1986, 1986 
cassette recording) seem to offer a better fit to the 
cumulative research presented in this paper, including the 
current study . However, it is to be strongly noted that 
although the current study showed that 4 year olds can 
distinguish the mental from the physical realms, it did not 
specifically address other aspects encompassed in the 
theories and in some of the literature mentioned. These 
other aspects, including the impact of encouraging belief or 
disbelief in fantasy, are fertile areas for continued study. 
The cumulative literature supports the need for a 
theory that better accounts for all the evidence. 
Specifically, two studies (Prentice, Schmechel & Manosevitz, 
1979 and Lesser & Paisner, 1985) suggest a potentially 
important explanation for why the environmental influence in 
the current research had no effect. The authors of these 
articles suggest that most children and adults, as they 
mature, are able to deal more naturalistically with their 
mental contents and with their world, However when external 
pressures to maintain belief in non-naturalistic thinking 
are operative, the affective conflicts and incentives 
working against relinquishing such beliefs may make 
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naturalistic causal reasoning more difficult. Prentice, 
Schmechel & Manosevitz (1979) suggest this in the following 
quote: 
Clearly, a number of children who are more advanced in 
cognitive maturity maintain their belief in Santa 
Claus. Presumably some children retain their belief in 
the face of LOGICAL INCONSISTENCIES simply because the 
INCENTIVES FOR BELIEF ARE SO GREAT. The child may be 
persuaded by the parents to retain belief in Santa 
while at the same time he is being rewarded by them for 
relinquishing other types of magical thinking. Gould 
( 1972) asserts that as children mature, they normally 
manifest an ability to deal more objectively in all 
realms of interaction with their world, as well as in 
their mental life. However, where certain AFFECTIVE 
CONFLICTS are present, 'the gradations and distinctions 
achieved in causality comprehension emerge more slowly 
and are less stable than in impersonal, 
objectively-structured situations.' (Gould, 1972, p. 
58)" (Prentice, Schmechel, Manosevitz, 1979, p. 666, 
emphasis added) 
Given these ideas, why did the current study fail to 
support the idea that fantasy and reality environmental 
influences would have differing effects? In both conditions 
the children were able to differentiate fantasy from reality 
in the ensuing judgment task. One answer is that my theory 
is wrong and perhaps children are not as effected by the 
environment, perhaps they are more biologically determined. 
Another explanation might be that a one and a half 
minute story was not enough of an environmental effect to 
compete with four years of a child's personal experience 
with the environment. Children across all story groups 
could differentiate physical from mental phenomena and 
possible mental phenomena from impossible mental phenomena 
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(i.e. , fantasy). Also, the questions in the judgment task 
did not relate to the story and this may have hindered 
seeing any short-range effect that the story might have had. 
The ensuing judgment task questions were very down to earth 
simple questions which seemed to do a very good job at 
tapping children's actual abilities but perhaps did not 
isolate possible cognitive, affect-laden situations when 
children tend to become more confused about the reality 
status or what actions they should take in a situation. 
So the question remains open: How does one explore the 
effect of environmental influences vis a vis fantasy/reality 
differentiation on children's thinking processes - or is 
there no effect. One suggestion is to change the type of 
questions asked in the judgment task to relate more directly 
to the story content. Another suggestion is to do some 
naturalistic studies of groups of children differing more 
long range in their upbringing (across belief systems) 
regarding fantasy, magical beliefs, etc. Several studies 
have been done along these lines, for instance exploring 
parental encouragement of mythical figures (e.g., Santa 
Claus) as Prentice and colleagues ( 1978) have done, and 
looking at childrearing styles and the effect on children 
(Sigel, ed, 1985). 
Perhaps a more extreme contrast would be to look at 
preschool children who either have a reality oriented 
schooling (e.g., the Montessori approach) versus a 
35 
dogmatic/authoritarian mystical approach. Also a cultural 
or historical study could be done looking at the thinking 
processes of children across cultures and history. 
Finally, it might be interesting to test a group of 
children using several stories or judgement tasks that vary 
in the emotional attachment to certain beliefs (such as 
stories about a kitten versus stories about Santa Claus). 
The current approach was meant to be an extension and 
improvement over the approach used by Koutsourais. She used 
an explanation of a remote occurrence, evaporation, to gauge 
the child's reality oriented capacity. The content of my 
story was intentionally made simple ( two children playing 
with a kitten) to adequately tap the child's true abilit y . 
As discussed above it is time to return to the drawing board 
to further refine a method to explore this hypothesis. 
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APPENDIX A 
Refresher of Piaget's Preoperational Stage 
(adapted from Dworetzky's Textbook, ch. 10) 
I. Cognitive Development is the result of 
A. Genetic development of the nervous system 
B. Environmental experiences 
(Since most of us have similarities in both of these 
areas predictable cognitive developmental stages will 
occur. All children advance through these stages, 
although the intellectually impaired might go slower 
or not reach the top stage.) 
II. Major terms used by Piaget and their interrelationship 
A.SCHEMA: An individual's comprehension of the world, 
like a map or schematic of the world around them and 
stored in memory. Since children have less well 
developed cognitive brains structures and less 
experience, their schemata is QUALITATIVELY 
different from an adult's schemata. 
B. ADAPTATION: The ability to fit in with one's 
environment. 
Two types 
1. Assimilation: The act of taking in new 
information and integrating it into evolving or 
completed cognitive structures. 
2. Accommodation: The process in which a person 
adjusts the existing schemata or cognitive 
structure to incorporate new elements in its 
experience. 
C. Equilibration: An innate force that drives 
children to pursue adaptation which helps bring 
them through the cognitive development stages. 
(They resolve discrepancies between existing cognitive 
structures and experience.) 
D. Cognitive stages have the following characteristics: 
1. The ages Piaget gives are only approximate. 
2. All children go through each stage in the 
sequence given. 
3. In transition between stages, a child may 
show characteristics of both stages. 
4. Older children or adults may opt not to use 
their higher structures and may rely on lower 
states of cognition. 
5. The stages are epigenetic (including aspects of 
both genetics and the environment. 
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6. Cognitive stages are related to the maturation 
of cogn i tive structures in the brain/nervous 
system. 
III. The Preoperational Period (2-7 years) 
A. Characterized by the ability to use internal 
images and symbols - possibly the beginning of 
self-awareness and thought. 
B. Called "preoperational" because children in this 
stage have not yet developed the more advanced rules of 
thought. 
C. Two stages within this period: 
1. Preconceptual stage (ages 2-4): Immature concepts 
Two types of reasoning processes: 
a. Syncretic: objects are classified by a limited 
and changing set of criteria - ex. "The hat goes 
with the bird because they are both blue." 
b. Transductive: Inferences about the 
relationship between two objects is based solely 
on a single isolated attriute. ex, A is hungry, B 
is hungry therefore A is B. 
Animistic thinking is common to this stage. 
2. Intuitive Stage (ages 4-7): Beliefs are based on 
what is sensed or imagined rather than logical or 
rational thought. 
Egocentrism: 
stage where 
perspective. 
Characteristic of children in this 
they see the world from their own 
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APPENDIX B 
Definitions of Piaget's Types of Causal Reasoning 
in Young Children 
1. Motivational Causality: A psychological motive is 
the cause of things. For example, "I fell because Santa is 
punishing me." "Nightmares are sent to us because we are 
bad." or "The ball decided to hit the window." Things, 
such as the ball, are conscious. 
2. Phenomenistic Causality: Two unrelated facts 
happen together in time and space and the child sees them 
as causally related. For example, "The ball fell because 
it is red." 
3. Finalistic Causality: A description is 
substituted for causality, without reference to origins, 
consequences, motives or consciousness. For example, "A 
tree has leaves because they are part of a tree." 
4. Moralistic Causality: Events occur because they 
have to. For example, "The sun must set so that we can 
have night." "The ball must bounce so that we can have fun." 
5. Magical Causality: One's gestures, words and 
thoughts can influence people and events, i.e., they can 
either cause something to happen, or prevent something 
from happening. For example, "If I wave my magic wand, 
I can stop dad from spanking me." or "If I think hard 
enough, I can make Santa give me more gifts." 
6. Animistic Causality: Attributing motives 
and psychological causes to physical phenomena. For 
example, "Clouds move so that they can get from place to 
place." 
7. Artificialistic Causality: Humans created 
metaphysical objects. "Men made the sun." 
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Appendix C 
Informed Consent Letter and Parental Questionnaire 
Greetings, 
As a graduate student in the psychology department at 
the University of Rhode Island and as a mother of two 
children, ages six and eight, I have developed an interest 
in the way children think. My interest has evolved into a 
master's study designed to assess the thinking abilities of 
young children (age 4). 
In the current literature various methods have been 
used to determine how and when a child learns to 
distinguish mental phenomena form physical phenomena. 
Most notable, the prodigious studies by Jean Piaget have 
sought to answer these questions. In studying and 
cat·egorizing children's causal explanations, Piaget 
developed a stage theory of cognitive development. The 
purpose of the current study is to examine the effect of the 
environment on children's causal thinking and to 
validate that "preoperationa l " children (Piaget's term 
for a stage children pass through where he proposes 
that they are incapable of distinguishing mental from 
physical phenomena} can differentiate mental phenomena 
from physical phenomena and that they can distinguish 
fantasy from reality when these distinctions are 
assessed very concretely. 
What this involves is telling the children some simple 
short stories (e.g., about a dog or a similar animal), 
showing them some colorful cards of children and asking 
them some questions (e.g., Can Sandy hear the dog bark?) 
which will be audiotaped. I will also be doing a short 
playful activity with them such as tossing a bean bag into 
a wooden frame. 
This area of research has widespread implications. 
The ideas we have about the developing child's mind 
influence our childrearing practices, our educational 
perspectives and ultimately the type of culture, 
politics and aesthetics that predominate. 
If you are interested in having your child 
participate, complete and return the bottom form. Due to 
the limited scope of the study, I will only be able to see 
children age 4. Please be sure to include your child's 
birth month and year. The study takes about 15-25 
minutes total. Parents will be asked to fill out a 
short questionnaire for research purposes only 
(demographic information). Once you give consent. I 
will additionally ask permission of your child. I have 
planned the study to be fun and interesting for the 
children. 
This study has been approved by the Institutional 
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Review Board at the University of Rhode Island. There are 
no risks or personal benefits involved in this study. The 
specific material I gather will be kept confidential and 
will not be shared with anyone outside my research 
commit tee. Nursery, day-care or camp personal are not 
involved in this research. You are free to refuse to 
participate and in no way will your decision affect your 
child in day-care, nursery school or camp. I am acting 
ind ependentl y as a graduate student from the University of 
Rhode Island. 
If you are 
please fill 
by 
interested in having your child participate, 
out and return the informed consent form below 
*********************************************************** 
Thank you for your time and interest. Please feel free to 
call me if you have any questions ( 647-5387). If I'm not 
home, you may leave a message on my answering machine and 
I'll return your call. 
Thanks, 
Ellen Kenner 
Informed Consent Form 
I, ____________ , voluntarily give my consent for my 
child to participate in the above study. My 
child's age is and his/her birthdate is 
Year ___ Month ___ _ 
I understand that this study is for educational purposes. 
I am free to withdraw at any time and although the material 
gathered (simple yes/no responses and children's causal 
explanations) is not personal, my child's individual 
responses will be kept confidential. 
Signature of Parent or Guardian Date signed 
___ Check here if y ou want information on or are interested 
in participating in future studies on this topic. 
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CHILD: 
Appe ndi x J 
Parental Questionnaire 
(Please Print) 
Date _______ _ 
Child's name _______________ Age:Years __ Months __ 
Sex (circle one): Male Female 
Preschool or Daycare Experience: 
Type of experience Average Frequency/week Age No. of months 
FAMILY: 
Please list 
age and sex. 
your other children in order of birth giving 
(names are not needed) 
I 
Month and year of Birth Sex 
Circ l e the following which best applies to your situation: 
(c i rcle one per question ) 
1. Single Divorced 1st marriage Remarr i ed 
Years married 
2. Family sett i ng: Town/ city village rural 
3. Family income range (approx.) ___________ _ 
4. Cultural background: 
MOTHER: 
their 
Age ___ Occupat i on ________ _ Weekly work hours _____ _ 
Educat i on ( check one): 
no for ma l educat i on 
some gr ammar school 
finished 8t h grade 
some high school 
FATHER: 
h i gh school, plus 
technical tra i n i ng __ _ 
some college 
finished college 
schooling beyond 4 yr. col l ege __ 
Age ___ Occupation _________ _ Weekly work hours ____ _ 
Education (check one ) : 
no formal education 
some grammar school 
finished 8th grade 
some high school 
high school plus 
techn i cal training __ 
some college __ 
finished college 
schooling beyond 4yr. college 
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Child's name 
Please list your child's favorite books, movies and television 
programs. 
. Books Movies Television Programs 
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Appendix E 
Demographic Graphs 
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Demographic Graphs 
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Appendix F Reality based story 
Danielle and Tommy were sitting together on the 
grass. Danielle was playing with her scampering kitty. 
Suddenly her kitty jumped on her lap and licked her on the 
nose. Tommy was watching the kitty and he thought it was 
silly that the kitty was licking Danielle on the nose. 
Danielle then felt the kitty scamper off her lap and 
watched it leap onto Tommy's lap. 
and felt the kitty's soft, fluffy 
Tommy cuddled the kitty 
fur. The kitty then 
left Tommy's lap and climbed into the tree in back of 
Tommy. Then Tommy looked at the tree, he could easily 
spot the kitty because of the pretty jeweled collar it was 
wearing around its neck. Danielle wished she had another 
kitty so that the two kitties could play together. She 
decided she would ask her mother if they could buy 
another kitty at the pet store. Tommy did not know what 
Danielle was thinking. Tommy then spotted the kitty on 
the branch above him. He reached up to get the kitty but 
the playful kitty jumped onto his shoulder instead. Tommy 
took the kitty off his shoulders and he felt its soft fur. 
Then Tommy's mother called for him to go home. He put the 
kitty in a kitty box. Later, when Tommy and Danielle went 
to the kitty box, the playful kitty looked up at them. 
They opened the box and Danielle felt the soft, fluffy 
kitty. She let the kitty down onto the grass and Danielle 
scampered and almost tripped over her , playful kitty. 
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Fantasy-based story 
Danielle and Tommy were sitting together on the 
grass. Danielle was thinking ab out a flying kitty and 
suddenly-poof ( ! ! ! ) right 
kitty floated down from 
the winged kitty and 
before her eyes a fluffy winged 
the sky. Tommy could not see 
he thought it was silly that 
Danielle said she was petting her soft winged kitty. 
Danielle then watched her kitty scamper out of her arms and 
leap onto Tommy's lap. Tommy could not see or feel the 
kitty. The kitty then left Tommy's lap, flapped its wings 
and flew into the tree in back of Tommy. As it did so, a 
jeweled collar appeared around its neck. Then Tommy looked 
at the tree; He could not see the kitty but he did see 
a jeweled collar hanging in mid air. Danielle wished for 
another kitty. 
above turned into 
She thought real hard and a fluffy cloud 
another flying scampering kitty. This 
time Tommy saw the kitty flying around overhead. Tommy 
felt the kitty land on his shoulder and Tommy picked it up 
and felt its soft fur. Then Tommy's mother called for 
him to go home. He put the kitty in a kitty box. Later, 
when Tommy and Danielle went to the kitty box, the kitty 
was not there-it had poofed(! ! ! ) away. They opened the box 
- no kitty. Tommy could still see and touch the soft, 
fluffy kitty that he was thinking of . He picked up the 
kitty to feel its soft fur. Danielle also scampered with 
and tripped over the kitty that Tommy was thinking of. 
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Appendix G 
Categories of Explanations 
(from Wellman and Estes 1986) 
1. Mental term-repetition: Child uses the same mental 
term as that in the presentation (e.g. , Why can't she 
touch it? "She's only pretending). 
2. Mental term-substitution: Child uses a mental term not 
in the presentation (e.g., " It's just imagination"). 
3. Reality criteria: Child appeals to one of the three 
reality criteria. 
a. Positive explanations mean the child asserts that 
the i tern meets the criteria (e.g. , Why can she pet it? 
"Because she can touch it"). 
b. Negative explanations mean the child asserts that 
th e i tern fails the criteria (e.g. , "She CAN'T touch it": 
"It's invisible"). 
4. Reality status: Child refers to the reality of the item. 
a. Positive 
the i tern is real 
explanations mean the child asserts that 
(e.g., "It's really a dog;" "It's a real 
one"). 
b. Negat ive use means the child asserts the item is not 
real (e.g., "It's a fake"; "It's not reall y a cookie ") . 
5. Location or possession: Child refers to the location of 
the item or its possession by the character. 
a. Positive explanations mean the child asserts that he 
i tern is there or is possessed (e.g. "It's there"; "His 
mother gave him one"). 
b. Negative e xplanations mean the child asserts that 
the i tern is not there or not possessed (e .g. , "It' s all 
gone"; "It's only in his mind"). 
6. Uninterpretable/I don't know: 
uninterpretable explanation or says 
"Because," "He just does," etc. 
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Child gives an 
"I don't know, " 
Appendix H 
CHILDREN'S VERBAL RESPONSES TO JUDGMENT TASK 
Codes: 
* Intere•ting comment 
** Experimenter l's subjects. 
Experimenter 2'~ subjects are left unmarked.Appendix I 
**l R 
Because it's inside of him - he's thinking.(F) 
Cuz he's closing his eyes. 
Because when he's thinking and he's trying to think of thinking 
of ants cuz both see ants before but not ants riding a bicycle. 
Only if I have a picture of a pup inside me.(B) 
I know a man who can turn into a car. 
Cuz thinking is in his body.IC) 
I dream about some. 
Because it's inside of her.IE) 
Because she has it.IA) 
**2 J 
Because it's - in her mind.ID) 
Because it's not in her mind. 
Because it's still in her mind. 
Because it's still in his. (Fl 
Not in his mind. 
Still thinking of it. 
Still thinking of it.(El 
Because it's outside.(B) 
I have one at home.IC) 
Because, uh, he just does. 
Because he can't put his hand in and reach it out. 
Because she can't put her hand in and reach it.(A) 
**3M 
Because. ( D ) 
Don't know. ( C) 
Because I hate dogs. (Bl 
**4 J 
Because there is none. !C) 
*Cuz thinking is onl y imagination. 
Cuz she's inside. (D) 
Because it's on the ground. (8) 
Don't know. ( E) 
*Cuz the ants are small and no one could see them riding a 
bicycle cuz have to buy one but ants have no change.IF) 
6 T 
Because he could fall. (Fl 
It's poison. 
I don't kn .ow. ( C l 
He'll be hungry again. 
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He's nice and soft. (Bl 
He flies away. !Dl 
Her eyes are open. 
It's good for you. (El 
She has to brush her teeth. (A) 
It's not good for you. 
*i M 
Don't know. (E, A, C, D, Fl 
He has it on a leash. (Bl 
8 C 
Don't know why. (B,A,D,C,E,Fl 
I his pinchurs to bite you. (Fl 
9 R 
It's a cookie. (Al 
The cookie will get rotten or eaten. 
It's a puppy. (Bl 
It's a cupcake. (Cl 
It will fly away. (Dl 
It's a bird. 
It will fly away. 
It's an ant. (Fl 
Cause its an apple. (El 
It's not a real one. 
**11 S - no responses (just nodedl 
**12 M 
Cuz you can eat it. (El 
Cuz it just lay there. 
*Cuz he can both share half of the cupcake. (Cl 
Cuz he can eat it at nighttime. 
*Cuz if she touched it it would fly away. (Dl 
*C~z she likes to see birds. 
*Cuz I couldn't see it if I closed my eyes and think about it. ~ 
*Cuz I can't see it when I have my .eyes closed. 
**13 L 
Because (Dl 
Because she's thinking about one. !El 
Because she's thinking about one but she can't see it because 
there is no kinda apple that can dance - that kinda would - She's 
thinking of one but there's none. 
Don't know. (F,Cl 
**14 C 
Because he doesn ' t have.IC) 
Because it's not there 4 
*No cuz it's not there, he's pretending he's holding it. (Bl 
(ans indicates that there is no puppy on pie or cookie card) 
Because it's not there. (El 
But I saw an apple that I can eat. 
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Because it would be there but you'd be thinking about it. 
Cuz it might fall apart cuz ant's bones are really delicate. (Fi 
Because it's not there 
Because it might die. 
That would be funny a little bicycle - there's no such thing. 
' Because it wouldn't be there but you could think about it. 
Because it's not there: (Dl 
Because it might fly away up in the sky. 
16 L 
Just because. IA) 
I don't know 
Because she can't eat it.(E) 
*She is blind. 
Because I just can't. 
* Her eyes are closed. (Dl 
A bluebird. 
His eyes . are open. !Bl 
Don't know. 
A green one. 
He doesn't have it in his hand.IC) 
It's in his mind. 
Black and has legs and a face. 
Because he has no bike. (Fl 
*li D 
He just can. (Cl 
For after lunch. 
I don't know the whole body inside. (Bl 
Maybe he petted it one day and tomorrow too. 
Her body makes her eyes open. (El 
It might be gone tomorrow. 
They could share it.(Al 
If there is any left. 
Her body makes her eyes see.(Dl 
It might be gone.(D,Fl 
18 N 
It's not on the ground.(El 
It's not at her house. 
*You think in your dreams. 
It's in her hands. (A) 
She can put it away for tomorrow. 
*If you dream you can think you are eating it. 
Because she is dreaming about it , she can see it. ID) 
It's not in her hand. 
She doesn't have one. 
It 0 s not in his hand. (El 
He doesn't have it. • 
He doesn't have a bike -he can't touch it. (Fl 
l)on -, t know where. 
He has it there. (Bl 
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19 K 
She has to eat it. IA) 
That is how we think to sleep. 
He has to pet it. (Bl 
rt has to share the puppy to pet it. 
If you want one. 
He has to eat it. (Cl 
He has to take half, 
He has to eat the whole thing. 
It will bite. (Dl 
She has to be careful it will not bite. 
It is small. (Fl 
Both have to see it. 
It will walk all over and tickle. 
She has to eat it.(E) 
It will walk on her head. 
It is step on us. 
It doesn't dance, we eat it. 
**21 E 
Because he's thinking of it. (Cl 
Cuz it's invisible. IC,D,E,Bl 
Had one - ·nothing. (Fl 
**22 C 
If he does it too hard it will squish him.(F) 
Not if he's up in an airplane. 
Only in a story. 
Because if they're talking and look down and see puppies.(Bl 
If she wants to.(Al 
If it was her pet.ID) 
Not if she's thinking of one - cuz it's just her imagination. 
She's just thinking of one. 
Not if dancing - that would be a cartoon.IE) 
That's sill~,.. 
Not if he's just thinking about one. (Cl 
Because of one - can't see if he's thinking of it. 
**23 T 
Because you can know what a cookie looks like. (Al 
Because you know what a puppy looks like. !Bl 
Because you know what an ant on a bicycle looks like. (Fl 
Because he doesn ' t have any? in his head.IC) 
Because she's just thinking about it. ( E i 
Because it's not. i.i th her. ( D) 
Because thinking about it. 
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**24 J 
Because it's so grand, Giant people, giant monsters too, 
everyday. (E) 
But I- can think about apples you _ can eat. 
Because it's not so giant, Lt .'s small. (Cl 
B~cause he ~ants to eat a little pieca . of it right now because he 
likes it. 
I don't know how to think about it. I just know how to think 
about small apples. 
All the time but ant's don't ride bicycles.CF) 
Because he's going to have big bicycle everyday. 
Only seen ants but they walk. 
I eat cookies. (Al 
No, I don't want to. 
Not when she closes her eyes. (DI 
Because he has eyes open. 
It might fly by everyday. 
*Because I don't . want to. I want ~o think about apple you can 
eat. 
26 C 
*Because it's in his hands and he touches it. (Cl 
*He can leave it so no one can steal it. 
Because she has eyes. (Al 
So no one can steal it. 
*Because it's in my mind. (Al 
Because it's very small and can fly.(Fl 
If it flew away. 
The day before only. 
It's in my mind. 
It flew to her. (DI 
In her mind. 
Because it would be gone from the tree. 
Only if it were not dancing. (El 
In her mind. 
It danced away. 
Because he has eyes. !Bl 
It's in my mind. 
27 B 
Cause the dog is around. {Bl 
His eyes are closed.(Cl 
He is close. 
It's warm. 
Her eyes are open. (A) 
It's warm and choclate. 
It's around. ( D l 
Her friend is around. 
The ant is around. (Fl 
The friend can see it. 
The ant will be them tomorrow. 
*Ant's can't ride bicycles. 
If you are thinking you can remember it. 
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Her eyes are opened.(El 
The apple will be there tomorrow. 
**Apples can't dance. 
28 P 
It's there all the time. (El 
Cause he doesn't think about it. 
When I was a baby. 
There is always one. (Cl 
He doesn ' t think about it. 
It doesn't have a face on it. 
It flies away. (Dl 
She doesn't think about it. 
It won't fly away. 
*There is always a bicycle. (Fl 
~rt was in a store. 
He bought one. (Bl 
He's so soft and gentle. 
There is always a cookie she makes.(Al 
She likes cookies. 
29 M 
Cause. (B, C, A, Dl 
Cause he has eyes. (Fl 
·Cause he has hands. 
Just an ant. 
She has eyes. (El 
It's hers. 
**31 A (shakes head - quiet) 
Cuz she' 's thinking of it.(Dl 
Cuz she can't see it. 
Cuz he's thinking about it.(Fl 
Don't know. 
**32 L 
Not when she opens her eyes.(Dl 
Cuz if it were in both minds the y could see .it. 
Cuz she's just imagining it.(El 
Only if that friend is thinking about the apple that dances too. 
Only if he's thinking of it too.(Fl 
I don't know.(Al 
~Y dad got 3 cupcakes from work. 
Because he's just imagining it.(Ci 
**33 A 
Because he's thinking of it and the other person can't see it. tCl 
Because she's not the other person.(El 
Because that's what's in our dreams. 
I usu~ly get bad thoughts in my dreams so I get to go down wi~h 
my mother for cake and milk. 
Her eyes are closed.(DI 
I have one at home. 
58 
Because not looking at it.(Al 
Because it's not in her dream anymore. 
Because it;s a real puppy.(Bl 
**34 T 
Because it's not with her. !El 
*Cuz no apples dance. 
Because there's no dancing apple. 
Cuz he doesn't have one. (Cl 
No cuz it's not there. 
Cuz it will get staled. 
Don't know. 
Because she doesn't have one. (Dl 
Because not there. 
Because it will fly away. 
Don't know. (Fl 
Cuz he got a puppy. (Bl 
Because she gots one. (Al 
Becasue she as one~ silly. 
*36 A 
He's not there. !Bl 
Don't knm/. 
It's still on the tree.(El 
It might been on her porch. 
Her eyes are open. (Dl 
It might be in her mom? 
Don' know. 
It's in his bedroom. (F) 
It might no be in her hand. (Al 
It might still be in her hand. 
It might not be in his hand. (Cl 
No reason. 
*37 A 
He lives in a tree.(Dl 
She likes cookies. She likes to eat them. (Al 
Ants can't ride bikes. Cause I know how to sleep. (Fl 
He likes puppies. He likes puppies. He likes them too. He · s 
going to school. (Bl 
He likes cupcakes too. His mother won't let him get it on his 
shirt. (Cl 
An apple can dance. She is going to save it.(E) 
*38 S 
Cause she has eyes. (A) 
It will be all smoochy. 
Cause he has eyes.(Fl 
Cause it broke. 
Cause he has eyes.(Cl 
It will be smoochy. 
Cause he has eyes. (El 
Smoochy. 
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He has eyes.(B) 
Cause it won't be broken. 
It won't be broken.(Dl 
39 A 
Cause he has eyes . (B) 
Don't know. 
He doesn't have it.(Cl 
He didn't have lunch yet. 
She has it . ( A ) 
She has eyes. 
She didn't have lunch. 
It flies but she can see it fly. (Dl 
They can look but not touch. 
She can try to catch him. 
It goes fist. (Fl 
People have eyes. 
*I just saw an ant. 
*People eat apples _. (El 
I ate it. 
**41 J 
Because it's not there.(D,C,F,E) 
It's silly.(Fl 
**42 R 
Cuz. ( F) 
**43 M 
. Cuz. (El 
Not real. 
Cuz he got eyes. (Fl 
No cuz might bite him. (Dl 
Cuz she got eyes. 
Cuz come to her house. 
Cuz he got eyes. (Cl 
After lunch. 
**44 A 
Because he doesn ' t have one.(Cl 
*Because it's just in the mind. 
*Because it's just in her mind, she can't feel it.(El 
Guz it's reall y in her mind, can't touch it or do anything wi~h 
an ything. 
Because if y ou wanted 
Cuz it's in his mind. 
Cuz she has it in her 
to you could. 
(Fl 
hand. (Al 
Because it's in his mind. 
Cuz it's his puppy. (Bl 
Because it's in her mind. (Dl 
**Because no friends can see in other people's minds. 
45 C 
Just because. (Fl 
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Just can't. 
No reason. ( D l 
Might not be there. (El 
*46 R 
No reason.(C,E,A, B, D) 
Cause he can see the road. (Fl 
4i P 
There is no bird. (D) 
Cause it is there. 
Cause they are too tiny. (Fl 
It's very hard to see. 
Then he'll see it. 
It was climbing. 
There is no make.(C) 
Tomorrow it won't .be there. 
He knows it is there. (Bl 
He will see it. 
She can't see one dancing. (El 
It's not there. 
She will see it. 
*~ever saw one that dances. 
She can't see it.(A) 
She will see it. 
Tomorrow she can eat it. 
48 G 
*Because he is a person and the puppy isnot invisible. (Bl 
*The puppy you can feel. 
*It's invisible. (C,D) 
It's at home. ( C) 
It's in its case.(D) 
She will be there to take it out of the cage. ((carryover from 
story) i 
It's back in the fridge. (El 
Because it's home and he can eat it. 
It's here ....-ith her. (Ai 
It's invisible.(F) 
He will have a bicycle ready for it. 
***Your mind can think about anything it wants to. 
** ➔ 9 E- no responses 
**50 H 
Because she won't want to eat tomorrow. (Al 
Because she's, um, I like to see it - the apple that dances.IE! 
Because she's just thinking about it. (D) 
Because he's just thinking about it. (Cl 
**51 K 
Because it's just little. !El 
Don't know.!E,A,B,C,D,Fl 
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Because they have no feet. 
*Because it's going to get all dirty and rotten. (A) 
**52 L 
If she wants to. !El 
Don't know. (C,D,F,Bl 
53 K 
No reason. (Bl 
Just because. IF) 
I don't know. 
Just can't think of it. 
Just can't do it.IE) 
54 C 
No reason. (Al 
Cause it's not there. (D) 
It's not there.(C,E) 
Cause it's there.IE) 
Cause I can think about it. 
It's not these. !Fl 
Cause it's there. 
In my backyard. 
Cause it's there. (Bl 
55 B 
She sees with her eyes.(El 
It will still be there. 
If it flies away she can't see it.(Dl 
Maybe it will still be there. ID) ...... ((diff focus) l 
Cause it's there. !Al 
It comes back again. 
Cause it was there. (Cl 
It could still be near him. 
It will bite him. (Fl It is still there. 
It is soft.(B) It's on a leash. 
56 L 
Cause Alex is thinking of it. (Fl 
His eyes are open.(Bl 
It is still with him. 
Because she is only thinking. (El 
Because Darlene is thinking of it -not her friend. 
She is thinking of it.(Dl 
Because only Sara is thinking of it. 
It is in her hand. (Al 
She can put it in the cookie jar. 
*He is only thinking of it. (C) 
Only Jeff is thinking of it. 
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Favorite Movies, Books, TV Shows 
BOOKS 
1 R 
Sesame books 
2 J 
Dinosaur Days 
Lost in Dinosaur World 
(Anything and Everyth) 
3 M 
4 J- no demographic info 
6 T 
Bambi 
Mickey & the Giant 
Lady and the Tramp 
Cars/Trucks 
7 M 
Mercer Mayer Books 
Dr. Seuss Books 
Disney Books 
Loves all types 
8 C 
Curious George 
Little Red Caboose 
Dr. Seuss 
9 R 
MOVIES 
Disney 
Cartoon type 
Ghostbusters 
Videos 
E.T. 
Micky Mouse 
Snoopy 
Ghost busters 
Oliver & Co. 
Land Before Time 
Bambi 
Snow White 
E.T. 
Lady & the Tramp 
An American Tale 
Short Circuit 
Winnie the Pooh 
Curious George Pinocchio 
What did the Mailman brg Swiss Family Robnsn 
Babar 
All my books: 
Heavy construction 
11 S - no demographic info •.· 
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TELEVISION PROGRA~S 
Sesame Street 
Elephant Show 
AM Sat. Cartoons 
Inspector Gadget 
Cities of Gold 
The Little Prince 
Julia Child 
Wok with Yan 
He Man . 
Mr. Rogers 
Walt Disney World 
Sesame Street 
Ghostbusters/cartoon 
Transformers 
Big Bird 
Mickey Mouse Cartoon 
Full House 
Perfect Strangers 
Cartoons/ch.56 
Alf 
Cosby Show 
Webster 
Lassie 
Inspector Gadget 
Sesame Street 
Hr. Rogers 
This Old House 
Wheel of Fortune 
12 M 
Beatrix Potter 
Mother Goose 
Cinderella 
· Sleeping Beauty 
Bambi . 
13 L 
Richard Scary 
Learning to Read 
1-t C 
ABC 
Giving Tree 
Tiggy Goes to Hospital 
Care Bears 
Snow White 
Cinderella 
Sleeping Beauty 
Kidsongs Circus 
Wizard of Oz 
Cinderella 
Chipmunk Adventure 
16 L - no demographic info 
1 i' D 
Sun's up 
Duck ' s Birthday 
The Giving · Tree 
18 N 
Rose Petal Place 
The Wuzzles Best Gift 
Cinderella 
Night Before Xmas 
19 K 
Cinderella 
Snow White 
Wizard of Oz 
Three Amigos 
Dumbo 
Oliver & Co. 
Lady & the Tramp 
Wizard of Oz 
Snow White/7 Dwarfs 
Cinderella 
Cinderella 
E.T. 
21 E - no demographic info 
22 C 
Mercer Meyer Books 
Sesame Street Books 
Animal books - all kinds 
23 T - omitted this 
'.2-t J 
The Habit 
Curious George 
26 C - omitted this 
Barbar 
Micky Mouse 
Short Circuit 
E.T. 
The Habit 
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Sesame Street 
Muppet Babies 
Winnie - the Pooh 
Care Bears 
Bugs Bunny 
Sesame Street 
Punky Brewster 
Scooby-do 
Alf 
Cosby 
Winnie Pooh cartoon 
Sesame Street 
Today's Special 
Square One 
Zoobilie Zoo 
Ch. 4 
Sesame Street 
Mr.Rogers-these only 
Animal Programs 
Morning Cartoons 
Double Dare 
Cartoons/Ghost buster 
Jet.sons 
Alf 
21 Jump Street 
Curious George 
27 B 
Tractor Book 
Gold Bug Book 
28 P 
Very Hungr y Caterpillar 
Inside Out 
Happy Easter Book 
Where Wild Things Are 
Berenstain Bear Books 
29 M 
3 Bill y Goats Gruff 
Curious Goerge Stories 
Corduroy 
Ernie Gets Lost 
Dopey Dinosaur 
31 A 
Thingamajig 
Snow White 
Cinderella 
32 L 
Peter Pan 
Care Bears 
Sweet Dreams for Sally 
A Friend for Francis 
Winnie the Pooh 
34 T 
36 A 
Red Caboose 
We Help Mommy 
37 A 
Brown Bear 
Goodnight Book 
38 S 
Disney Books 
Bedtime Stories 
Animal Books 
Superman 
E.T. 
E.T. 
Oliver & Co. 
Lad y & the Tramp 
Wizard of Oz 
Ghost busters 
Roy Rogers Video 
Superman 
Land Before Time 
American Tale 
The 3 Amigos 
Bambi 
Cindereella 
Pinocchio 
Alice in Wonderld 
Care Bears-Wonderld 
Sesame Street 
Nickelodian 
Lassie 
Dennis the Menace 
Sat Cartoons:Suprman 
Muppet Babies 
Scoob y Dao 
Real Ghostbustr 
Full House 
Brave Start 
Gene Autry Westerns 
Roy Rogers 
Sharon - Lois & Brahm 
(Elephant Sho\. l 
The Little Koala 
Maple Town 
Disney 
Bill Cosby 
Cartoons 
My Little Pony 
Muppet Babies 
Hello Kitty 
Furrytale Theatre 
Wizard of Oz Jem 
Care Bear/Nutcrackr Punky Brewster 
Mary Poppins 
Charlotte's Web 
Land Before Time 
All Walt Disney 
E.T. 
My Little Pony 
American Tail 
Wizard of Oz 
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Mr. Rogers 
Sesame St. 
Punky Brewster 
Different Strokes 
Sesame S_treet 
· Cartoons:Disney, 
My Little Pony, 
Pooh Corner, etc. 
39 A 
Curious George Series 
Katy No Pocket 
Angelina Ballerina 
Annie & the Wild Animals 
Very Hungry Caterpillar 
42 R 
Goldilocks/3bears 
Amelia Bedelia Stories 
Sesame St. Books 
Dr. Seuss Books 
43 ~l 
Lion,Witch,Wardrobe 
She-Ra 
Muppets Movie 
Cinderella 
Mary Poppins 
Beverly Hills Cop 
Ghost busters 
Curious George Disney 
Little Train that Could 
Dinosaurs 
Scuffy the Tugboat 
41 J 
Fox in Socks Bambi 
Aesop for Children 
Where Wild Things Are 
Pinocchio 
Harold & Purple Crayon 
Curious George Takes Job 
Play with Me . 
The Little Engine that Could 
There's Nightmare in my Closet 
Richard Scarry's Best Word Bk 
and Busiest People Ever 
Magazines: 
Sesame Street 
Turtle 
four Big Backyard 
HA 
Where Wild Things Are 
Ragedy Ann and Andy 
Walt Disney 
Pooh Bear Collection 
Sesame Collection 
Golden Books 
45 C- no demogrpahic info 
46 R 
Sesame St. Books 
Land of Dinosaurs 
Mary Poppins 
Bambi 
Dumbo 
Ghost busters 
Land Before . Time 
66 
Sesame Street 
Pinwheel 
Heathcliff 
She-Ra 
Count Dracula 
Alf 
Sesame Street 
Wrestling 
Mr. Rogers 
Today's Special 
Sesame Streei:. 
Alf 
Cartoons 
Cartoons: Bugs Bunnv 
Casper 
Reading Rainoo,.; 
3,2,1 Contact 
Square One T\' 
Sesame Streei:. 
Mr. Rogers 
Reading .Rainbo .. 
3-2-1 Contac'[ 
Cosby 
Disne :v Sun e,·e 
Cops and Crooks 
47 P 
Inspector Gadget 
Great Mouse Detective 
Trucks 
48 G 
Go Dog Go 
Titanic 
Nature &Other Earthlings 
Berenstain Bears/Spooky 
Old Tree 
49 E 
.-Ul books 
50 M - omitted this part 
51 K 
Dr. Seuss Books 
Sesame Street Books 
Oliver & Co. 
Top Gun 
Dumbo 
E.T. 
Chitty Chitty Bang 
Love Bug 
Pete's Dragon 
Pooh 
Pippi Longstocking 
Space Camp 
Lady and the Tramp 
Care Bears 
Cinderella 
Square One 
3-2-1 Contact 
Reading Rainbow 
·Sesame Street 
Charlie Brown Specl 
Duck Takes · 
Disney 
Gummi Bears 
Sesame Street 
Mr. Rogers 
Sesame Street 
Kidsongs 
Mr. Rogers 
Sesame Street 
Mr. Rolo1:ers 
Full House 
------------------------------------ ------52 
Emily -omitted this info 
----------------------------------- ----
53 K - no demographic info 
-----------------------------------··--- --54 C 
Berenstain Bears Series None in particular 
Dr. Seuss books 
Mike Mulligan&Steam Shovl 
Corduro:-,· 
Richard Scarry Stories 
Going Places etc 
55 B 
Cat: in the Hat 
Curious George 
Robert the Horse 
Winnie the Pooh 
The Little Red Hen 
57 L 
almost any kind 
E.T. 
Sleeping Beauty 
Mary Poppins 
Annie 
Walt Disn~y Movies 
Land Before Time 
Pippi Longstockings 
67 
Sesame Street 
Mr. Rogers 
Square One T\ . 
321 Contact 
Sesame Stre~ t 
~lr. Rogers 
Zoobilee Zoo 
Maple Town 
Tcida~·' s Special 
Elephant Show 
Punky Brewster 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Barnes, H. & Lyons, N. 
Rudolf Steiner method. 
Waldorf Schools. 
( 1986). Education as an art: The 
Massachusetts: Association of 
Berzonsky, M. (1971). The role of familiarity in 
children's explanations of physical causality. Child 
Development,42, 705-715. 
Brainerd, C.J. (1978). Piaget's theory of intelligence. New 
Jersey: Prentice-Hall. 
Bringuier, J. ( 1980). Conversations with Jean Piaget. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Campbell, S. (Ed. ) . ( 1980). Piaget Sampler: An introduction 
to Jean Piaget through his own words. New York: John Wiley 
& Sons. 
Collyer, C. E. & Enns, 
Variance: The basic designs. 
J. T. (1987). Analvsis of 
Chicago: Nelson-Hall. 
Dworetzsky, J. (1984). Introduction to child development. 
New York: West Publishing Co. 
Estes, D. , Wellman, H. , & J. Woolley. ( in press). Child's 
understanding of mental phenomena. Manuscript submitted for 
publication. To appear in H Reese (Ed.), Advances in child 
development and behavior, vol. 21. 
Inhelder, B. & Piaget, J. ( 1958). The growth of logical 
~t~h~i=· n=k=i=n=g~: ~F~r~o=m~~c=h~i~l=-d=h=o~o'--'d=-------'t~o"'--~a=d=-o==lc-=e'""'s~c=-e=n=cc..=e. New York : Basic 
Books. 
Inhelder, B., Sinclair, H. & Bovet M. ( 1974). Learning 
and the development of cognition. Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press. 
Kelley, D. ( 1984). A theory of abstraction. 
brain theory, VII(3 &4), summer/fall. 
Cognition and 
Kelley, D. (Speaker). (1986). The nature of freewill 
(cassette recording) Toronto: The Portland Institute. 
Kelley, D. ( 1986). The evidence of the senses. 
Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press. 
Keppel, G. ( 1982). 
Jersey: Prentice-Hall. 
Design and analysis (2nd ed ) . 
68 
Baton 
New 
Koutsourais, H. ( 1984). Inhibiting magical thought through 
stories. Child Study Journal 14, 227-236. 
Lesser, R. & Paisner, M. 
formal operational adults. 
( 1985). Magical thinking 
Human Development 28, 57-70. 
in 
Modgil, S. & Modgil, C. (1976). 
Compilation and commentary (Vols. 1-8). 
Publishing. 
Piagetian research: 
Great Britain: NFER 
Montessori, M. (1965). 
York: Schocken Books. 
Dr. Montessori's own handbook. New 
Morison, P. & Gardner H. (1978), Dragons and dinosaurs: 
The child's capacity to differentiate fantasy from 
reality. Child Development, 49. 642-648. 
Phillips, D. (1982). Perspectives on Piaget as Philosopher: 
The tough, tender-minded syndrome. In Modgil, S. & Modgil, 
C. (Eds. ) Jean Piaget: Consensus and controversy. (pp. 
13-29). Praeger Special Studies, Praeger Scientific. 
Phillips, J. (1975). The origins of intellect: Piaget's 
theory. San Francisco: W.H. Freeman & Co. 
Piaget, J. (1929). The child's conception of the world. 
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd. 
Piaget, J. (1951). The child's conception of physical 
causality. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd. 
Piaget, J. ( 1952). Judgment and reasoning in the child. 
New York: Humanities Press. 
Piaget, J. (1962). Play, dreams and imitation in 
childhood. New York: Norton & Co. 
Piaget, J, (1972). The principles of genetic epistemology. 
New York: Basic Books. 
Piaget, J. ( 1971). Psychology and Epistemology. (A. Rosin, 
Trans). New York: Grossman Publishers. (Original work 
published in 1970). 
Piaget, J. (1972). 
(W. Mays, Trans.). 
published 1970). 
The principles of genetic epistemology. 
New York: Basic Books. (Original work 
Peikoff, L. unpublished lectures given during sundry 
conferences. 
69 
Prentice, N., Manosevitz, M., & Hubbs, L. (1978). 
Imaginary figures of earl y childhood: Santa Claus, Easter 
Bunny, and the Tooth Fairy. American Journal of 
Orthopsychiatry, 48(4), 618-628. 
Rand, A. (1968/1975) . The new left: The anti-industrial 
revolution. New York: New American Library. 
Rand, A. (1979). Introduction to ob,jectivist episetemology. 
New York: New American Library. 
Randall, T. & Desrosiers, M. ( 1980). Measurement of 
supernatural belief: Sex differences and locus of control. 
Journal of Personality Assessment, 44(5), 493-498. 
Shatz, M. 
acquisition 
the first 
301-321. 
Wellman, H.M., & Silber, S. 
of mental verbs: A systematic 
reference to mental state. 
( 1983). The 
investigation of 
Cognition, 14, 
Sigel, I. ( 1985). Parental belief systems: the ps ychological 
consequences for children. New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates. 
Wellman, H. (1985). The 
Forrest-Pressley, G. 
Metacognition, cogniti on, 
San Diego: Academic Press. 
origins of metacognition. 
MacKinnon, & T. Waller 
and human performance (pp . 
In D. 
(Eds) 
1-31). 
Wellman, H. & Estes, D. ( 1986). Early understanding of 
mental entities: A re-examination of childhood 
realism. Child Development, 57, 910-923. 
70 
